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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE v.
BEACHLAND VENTURES, INC., Civ. No. 89-
2311 (S.D. Fla. filed Oct. 17, 1989).
JULIE M. LEVITT & MARTIN J. BIDWILL
This Article presents our readers with information about a case
that was filed just before this issue went to press. In National
Football League v. Beachland Ventures, Inc., the NFL and its
member club the Miami Dolphins brought suit to enjoin local bar
owners from violating the NFL's "blackout" rule by showing
"blacked out" games in their establishments. The editors of the
Review are of the opinion that this case potentially is of consider-
able importance and felt it incumbent upon us to inform our
readers about the case, even at this early stage of the proceedings.
The United States District Court has ordered a temporary re-
straining order in the case; the defendants are considering an ap-
peal to the Eleventh Circuit and expect to set a trial date in the
near future.
FACTS
On any given Sunday afternoon or Monday night during the
football season, bars and restaurants across the United States are
filled with patrons watching National Football League games on
the establishments' television sets. Sometimes the televisions are
showing games that are being broadcast on local television stations.
However, today it is quite possible to find the television showing a
game that is not being shown on local channels, but instead has
been received by the bar's satellite dish or cable television hook-
up.1 Many, but not all, of these games are "blacked out;"2 that is,
1. All of the defendants in Beachland received the games by satellites; none were re-
ceiving the game via cable television hook-up.
2. See infra note 22 for a discussion of the contractual origin of the black out rule and
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the NFL does not permit the game to be televised in the city or
metropolitan area in which the game is being played.
A satellite dish system allows a bar to receive blacked out
games by picking up the satellite feed from either the original
transmission or a broadcast of the game from a city in which the
game is being televised. Fearing that this activity ultimately will
harm its gate receipts and diminish the value of its television
rights,3 the National Football League (NFL) and its member clubs
frequently have brought suit to enjoin the activity. The NFL's
claims usually are based on allegations that the unauthorized dis-
play violates its copyright in the games" as well as its right to be
secure against unauthorized interception of the signal under the
Federal Communications Act.5
Recently, the NFL and the Miami Dolphins (plaintiffs)
brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida against several bar owners, an Elks' Club, and a
Moose Lodge (defendants), all located in South Florida's tri-
county area. National Football League v. Beachland Ventures,
Inc., Civ. No. 89-2311 (S.D. Fla. filed Oct. 17, 1989). The plaintiffs
seek a permanent injunction that would prohibit the defendants'
reception by satellite, and subsequent display in their establish-
ments, of locally blacked out games. The plaintiffs were successful
in obtaining a temporary restraining order6 on Friday, October 20,
1989, during a hearing before United States District Judge William
infra note 64 for a discussion of the antitrust exemption permitting the NFL to black out
games.
3. "The [television] contract limitations . . . foster development of a local following
for individual clubs." National Football League v. Alley, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 6, 8 (S.D. Fla.
1983). Cf. National Football League v. McBee & Bruno's, Inc., 792 F.2d 726, 728 (8th Cir.
1986) ("black out" makes the right to broadcast games more valuable because the black out
contributes to a full stadium, a more exciting crowd, and a more exciting television
program).
4. See infra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
5. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (Supp. IV 1986). 47 U.S.C. § 605 has been redesignated as § 705 by
the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, § 6(a), Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779,
2804 (1984). However, for the sake of uniformity, this Article will refer to the statute as §
605. See infra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
6. On October 26, 1989, the defendants moved the court for rehearing on the tempo-
rary restraining order, alleging that the plaintiffs have unclean hands. Specifically, they
claim that Joseph Robbie, the owner of the Miami Dolphins, Ltd. and a member of the
National Football League, is a member of a private club (LaGorce Country Club), located
within 75 miles of Joe Robbie Stadium, which has shown blacked out Dolphins games via
satellite dish. Defendants' Motion for Rehearing, National Football League v. Beachland
Ventures, Inc., Civ. No. 89-2311 (S.D. Fla. filed Oct. 26, 1989). The motion alleges that the
club has shown the games with the knowledge and consent of Robbie. Id. at 3. The defend-
ants have noticed Robbie for deposition to ascertain whether Robbie himself has watched
the games at the club. Id.
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Hoeveler. 7 Judge Hoeveler found, inter alia, that there was a sub-
stantial likelihood that the plaintiffs would succeed in proving at
trial copyright and Federal Communications Act violations.
The defendants presently are considering an appeal of this or-
der to the Eleventh Circuit" and have offered to prove at trial two
defenses:
(1) in response to claims of copyright infringement, the de-
fendants claim that their use falls into the "common use" excep-
tion of section 110(5) of the Copyright Act,9 which provides that no
violation of the copyright in a broadcast occurs if the transmission
is received on a receiving apparatus commonly used in the home;
(2) in response to claims of Federal Communications Act vio-
lations, the defendants claim that the plaintiffs' transmissions are
of a kind intended to be received by the general public and, hence,
are not protected by section 605 of the Federal Communications
Act.10
This Article presents the arguments of both sides on each is-
sue, discusses Judge Hoeveler's order, and alerts the reader to is-
sues of first impression that are present in the case but which, as
yet, have not been raised by counsel.
PLAINTIFFS' COPYRIGHT CLAIMS AND THE SECTION 110(5) DEFENSE
The gravamen of the plaintiffs' complaint is that the defend-
ants infringed the plaintiffs' copyrights by showing the copyrighted
NFL transmissions in their establishments, in violation of the
black out rule and without the plaintiffs' authorization." Before
discussing this alleged infringement, it is first necessary to examine
the genesis of the copyright which the plaintiffs claim in the trans-
mission of their games.
The Copyright Act of 1976 protects only "original works of au-
thorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . "..."12 In-
cluded as "original works of authorship" are motion pictures and
7. Temporary Restraining Order, National Football League v. Beachland Ventures,
Inc., Civ. No. 89-2311 (S.D. Fla. entered Oct. 20, 1989).
8. Telephone Interview with Hinda Klein, Rubin, Rubin & Fuqua, Miami, Florida,
attorney for defendants (October 25, 1989).
9. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (1982).
10. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (Supp. IV 1986).
11. Plaintiffs' Brief In Support Of Plaintiffs' Application For Temporary Restraining
Order And Preliminary Injunction And Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings Of Fact And Conclu-
sions Of Law at 13, National Football League v. Beachland Ventures, Inc., Civ. No. 89-2311
(S.D. Fla. served Oct. 20, 1989) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Brief].
12. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
19891
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audiovisual works."' Audiovisual works are defined by the Copy-
right Act as:
works that consist of a series of related images which are intrin-
sically intended to be shown by the use of machines or devices
such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together
with accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of
the material objects, such as films or tapes, in which the works
are embodied. 14
Further, the Copyright Act provides that "[a] work consisting of
sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is 'fixed' for
purposes of this title, if a fixation of the work is being made simul-
taneously with its transmission.''5
Applying the foregoing to the facts, it is clear whence the
plaintiffs derive their copyright. The plaintiffs argue that each of
the transmissions of televised NFL games is a wholly original
work. 6 Arguably, the transmissions fall within the Copyright Act's
definition of an audiovisual work in section 102. As the transmis-
sion is an original work, it need only be "fixed" in a tangible me-
dium to gain copyright protection. The necessary "fixation," the
plaintiffs claim, derives from their fixation of each transmission in
an audiovisual cassette tape, simultaneous with the telecasting.
13. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6) (1982).
14. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
15. Id. Ordinarily, one cannot bring suit for infringement of copyright until he has
registered his claim for copyright in the work. Section 411 provides an exception to this rule
for works that become fixed in the tangible medium simultaneously with their transmission,
as is the case with plaintiffs' games. Under § 411, plaintiff's can file an infringement action
either before or after the transmission/fixation, so long as:
(1) they serve notice on the infringer not fewer than 10 nor more than 30 days prior
to transmission/fixation, describing the work and the specific time and source of its first
transmission, and declare their intent to secure copyright in the work; and
(2) they make registration for the work within the three month period following the
first transmission.
National Football League v. McBee & Bruno's, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 880, 885 (D. Mo. 1985)
(construing 17 U.S.C. § 411 (1982)).
16. Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 11, at 7.
17. Id. The legislative history of the Copyright Act makes it clear that the transmis-
sion of a live sports event, if simultaneously recorded, is entitled to protection under the
Copyright statute:
The bill seeks to resolve, through the definition of "fixation" in section 101, the
status of live broadcasts-sports, news coverage, live performances of music,
etc.-that are reaching the public in unfixed form but that are simultaneously
being recorded. When a football game is being covered by four television cam-
eras, with a director guiding the activities of the four cameramen and choosing
which of their electronic images are sent out to the public and in what order,
there is little doubt that what the cameramen and the director are doing consti-
tutes "authorship." The further question to be considered is whether there has
[Vol. 6:139
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Such a practice clearly would meet the definition of "fixed" as set
out in section 101.' s Consequently, since the plaintiffs have an
original work which is "fixed" in a tangible medium of expression,
the NFL, and each of its teams, owns a copyright in the transmis-
sion of their games.
The Copyright Act provides that the owner of a copyright in
an audiovisual work has the exclusive right to perform and display
that copyrighted work publicly. 9 The statute considers a work per-
formed or displayed publicly when it is "perform[ed] or dis-
play[ed] ... at a place open to the public or at any place where a
substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a fam-
ily and its social acquaintances is gathered .. .."20 The plaintiffs
claim that the defendants' actions constituted public performance
or display of their copyrighted work.2 Since the plaintiffs did not
license the defendants to "publicly perform or display" the trans-
missions, the plaintiffs claim that the public display or perform-
ance infringed their copyrights in the transmissions.22 On this ba-
sis, they seek injunctive relief.
been a fixation. If the images and sounds to be broadcast are first recorded (on a
video tape, film, etc.) and then transmitted, the recorded work would be consid-
ered a "motion picture" subject to statutory protection against unauthorized re-
production or retransmission of the broadcast. If the program content is trans-
mitted live to the public while being recorded at the same time, the case would
be treated the same: the copyright owner would not be forced to rely on common
law rather than statutory rights in proceeding against an infringing user of the
live broadcast.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5665 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1476].
18. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982), set forth supra in text accompanying note 15.
19. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4)-(5) (1982).
20. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
21. Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 11, at 13. In showing the transmissions to the public in
their establishments, the defendants used allegedly all or substantial portions of the copy-
righted programs. Id.
22. Id. The NFL has contracted with the major networks-ABC, CBS, NBC, and
ESPN-to provide for the telecasting of their games. Id. at 5.
By these contracts, each network obtained exclusive rights to televise cer-
tain NFL games, subject to contractual limitations, among them the require-
ment that ... games [not sold out by 72 hours before game time] are not to be
broadcast live; that is, that they be blacked-out in the home club's home terri-
tory which is the area within a 75-mile radius of the club's home playing site.
National Football League v. McBee & Bruno's, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 880, 883 (E.D. Mo. 1985),
aff'd, 792 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986). "Among the purposes of these contract provisions are
protection of live gate attendance, protection of ticket sales and associated revenues, pre-
vention of oversaturation of the television viewing market, and approximate equalization of
the club's television exposure." Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 11, at 6. The NFL relies on an
exemption from the antitrust laws in refusing to allow a local station to carry a given game.
See infra note 64.
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The defendants do not challenge the plaintiffs' assertion that
plaintiffs' transmissions are a copyrighted work. Instead, the de-
fendants claim that their display of the blacked out games, because
they receive the games via satellite dish, is permitted as it falls
into the category of non-infringing acts under section 110(5) of the
Copyright Act.23 Section 110(5) provides that, despite the provi-
sions of section 106, the "communication of a transmission embod-
ying a performance or display of a work by the public reception of
the transmission on a single receiving apparatus of a kind com-
monly used in private homes" is not an infringement of a copy-
right. 4 Section 110(5) commonly is referred to as the public or
common use exemption because it allows technology which is com-
monly used in private homes to be used in a commercial establish-
ment without penalty under the copyright law.25 The legislative
history of the Copyright Act indicates that the purpose of Section
110(5) "is to exempt from copyright liability anyone who merely
turns on, in a public place, an ordinary radio or television receiving
apparatus of a kind commonly sold to members of the public for
private use."'26 The defendants argue that a satellite dish is a re-
ceiving apparatus which is commonly found in the home.
The plaintiffs directly refute this contention. They urge that,
unlike receiving devices such as the television and radio, satellite
dishes are not commonly used in private homes.2 7 The plaintiffs
basically argue that the receiving apparatus that picks up the
transmission is the satellite dish rather than the television and
since satellite dishes are not commonly used in private homes, sec-
tion 110(5), by its plain language, does not apply.
In the past, courts have agreed with plaintiffs who argued that
satellite dishes are not commonly found in private homes. For ex-
ample, in National Football League v. McBee & Bruno's, Inc.,25
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Mis-
souri rejected this argument, finding that satellite dishes were
outside the section 110(5) exemption because they were outnum-
bered by television sets in this country by more than 100 to one.29
23. Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs' Request For Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction at 6, National Football League v. Beachland Ventures,
Inc., Civ. No. 89-2311 (S.D. Fla. served Oct. 20, 1989) [hereinafter Defendants' Mem-
orandum].
24. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (1982).
25. Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 23, at 4.
26. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 17, at 5700.
27. Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 11, at 13.
28. 621 F. Supp. 880 (E.D. Mo. 1985), aff'd, 792 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986).
29. McBee, 621 F. Supp. at 887. The Eighth Circuit held that this determination was
[Vol. 6:139
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The Beachland defendants have noted the McBee findings. How-
ever, they point out that the Eighth Circuit in McBee left open the
possibility that these satellite dishes might someday be common-
place. 0 Given that possibility, the Beachland defendants argue
that, while there were only one million satellite dishes in use at the
time of the McBee decision in 1985, today there are more than 2.5
million dishes in the United States.3 1 The defendants go on to
point out that dish systems are more readily available to the gen-
eral public: satellite dish systems now cost between $1,499 and
$2,500 and, in fact, many systems can be financed for as little as
$41.00 per month,32 a cost similar to that of cable television ser-
vices. 3 Armed with these updated statistics, the defendants have
attempted to frame an argument to show "it is clear that satellite
dishes are commonly found in homes and thus the reception of
'blacked out' games by the Defendants falls within the [section
110(5)] home use exemption. '34
Essentially, in order to be entitled to an injunction, the plain-
tiffs must demonstrate that they will be irreparably harmed if the
court does not enter the injunction. 5 In the copyright context,
not clearly erroneous. 792 F.2d at 731. Yet, this comparison is illogical. At the simplest level,
both television sets and satellite dishes are receiving devices, but the similarity for purposes
of this analysis ends with this fact. Many homes in the United States are multiple-television
set homes, as defendants are expected to show at trial. On the other hand, one satellite dish
can feed any number of television sets within a home (or an apartment complex), so only
one is needed per home. See Testimony of Charles Blankenship, owner of GIC, Inc. (a satel-
lite retailer) at Hearing on Plaintiffs' Application for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary and Permanent Injunction, National Football League v. Beachland Ventures,
Inc., Civ. No. 89-2311 (S.D. Fla. held Oct. 20, 1989). Therefore, a comparison based on sheer
number of devices in use in American homes is drawn too broadly. A far more appropriate
comparison would examine the number of homes with satellite dishes and the number of
homes with cable converters, for, like a satellite dish, one cable hook-up can serve any num-
ber of television sets within a given home.
30. McBee, 792 F.2d at 731.
31. Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 23, at 6.
32. Id.
33. Testimony of Charles Blankenship, supra note 29.
34. Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 23, at 6. As Judge Hoeveler granted the
temporary restraining order, it appears that he believes that the circumstances have not
changed substantially. Moreover, as the standard of review applicable to his determination
will be whether his findings were clearly erroneous, it is unlikely that this determination will
be overturned at this stage of the proceedings.
35. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983). In order to obtain a prelimi-
nary injunction, a party first must satisfy four prerequisites:
1) a substantial likelihood that he will ultimately prevail on the merits; 2) that
he will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction issues; 3) that the
threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever damage the proposed in-
junction may cause the opposing party; and 4) that the injunction, if issued,
would not be adverse to the public interest.
19891
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where the intended use of copyrighted material is for a commercial
purpose, the likelihood of future harm is presumed.36 The defend-
ants concede as much.37 However, the defendants claim that the
presumption of irreparable harm is rebuttable and ultimately can
be overcome.3 " To illustrate their purported ability to rebut the
presumption, the defendants in Beachland produced affidavits of
bar patrons attesting that even if the bar did not show the game,
the patrons still would not attend the game in the stadium. 9 In
essence, the defendants argue that the patrons would not have at-
tended the game irrespective of whether it was broadcast in the
defendants' establishments. Further, they argue that there is sim-
ply no link between the defendant establishments' increased reve-
nues when showing blacked out games, and an increase in the
plaintiffs' profits when blacked out games are not shown.4" The
plaintiffs' response, akin to that of the plaintiffs' in McBee, would
be simple: more persons attend the games if there is no television
showing available; further, a full stadium translates into greater
United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1519 (11th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted).
This Article addresses the copyright issue only in terms of the first two requirements. In
addition to their denying that the plaintiffs incurred irreparable injury, the defendants
sought to attack the plaintiffs' prediction of success on the merits. The defendants argued
that the plaintiffs cannot succeed on the merits because changed circumstances have vali-
dated the argument that the display of the NFL games picked up on the satellite dishes fits
into the common use exemption embodied in section 110(5) of the Copyright Act. Defend-
ants' Memorandum, supra note 23, at 3-6. The defendants, however, also claim that the
plaintiffs are unable to meet their burdens on the third and fourth requirements. Defend-
ants' Memorandum, supra note 23, at 8-9.
36. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
37. Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 23, at 7.
38. Id.
39. Id. See also id. at Appendix. Cf. National Football League v. McBee's & Bruno's,
Inc., 792 F.2d 726, 729 n.5 (8th Cir. 1986) (An owner of one of the establishments testified
that when a blacked out game was shown he served 190 patrons, as opposed to a mere 30
customers on a regular Sunday.) However, the mere fact that an individual comes to a bar
to watch a game does not mean he would go to the stadium were the TV feed not available.
With no empirical proof, it is still an open question as to whether the inability to publicly
watch blacked out games via satellite dishes will stimulate stadium attendance.
40. Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 23, at 8-9. Because the result of Judge
Hoeveler's order is that the blacked out games are not going to be shown in the bars, it now
will be possible to determine whether the blackout enforcement actually will affect attend-
ance at the remaining Dolphin home games. Evidence that there is little or no resultant
effect will go a long way toward proving defendants' contention that there is no irreparable
harm to the Dolphins and the NFL.
On the other hand, it is questionable whether the defendants will be allowed to chal-
lenge this presumption at all, for the antitrust exemption from which the right to black out
games flows, see infra note 64, is based on the underlying presumption that gate attendance
is affected by a blackout. The district court is going to have to make a determination as to
what extent this antitrust presumption is properly imported into the copyright infringement
calculus.
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ticket sales and a more exciting-and therefore more marketa-
ble-television entertainment program."'
PLAINTIFFS' TELECOMMUNICATION CLAIMS AND THE PUBLIC USE
DEFENSE
None of the defendants in Beachland are licensed by the NFL
or the Miami Dolphins to receive the broadcast of any blacked out
NFL game.42 In addition to their copyright allegations, the plain-
tiffs claim that the defendants, by use of satellite dish antennae or
"earth stations," are intercepting their satellite transmission in vi-
olation of section 605 of the Federal Communications Act4 and
that the plaintiffs, therefore, are entitled to injunctive relief and
damages.44 Section 605(a) provides in part:
No person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept
any radio communication and divulge or publish the ... con-
tents [or] substance ... of such intercepted communication to
any person. No person not being entitled thereto shall re-
ceive . . . any communication ... and use such communication
... for his own benefit or for the benefit of another .... 45
The Federal Communications Commission considers the plaintiffs'
satellite transmissions to fall within the ambit of "radio communi-
cations" for the purpose of this section.46
The plaintiffs argue that the defendants' interception of the
broadcast and their display of the games to their patrons consti-
tutes unauthorized interception and receipt of private communica-
tions in violation of section 605(a).47 They allege that the commu-
nications are private transmissions to broadcast affiliates and are
41. National Football League v. McBee & Bruno's, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 880, 888 (E.D.
Mo. 1985), aff'd, 792 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986). The Eighth Circuit held this finding was not
clearly erroneous. 792 F.2d at 730.
42. Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 11, at 10-13.
43. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (Supp. IV 1986).
44. Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 11, at 16; Temporary Restraining Order, supra note 7,
at 2-3. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (Supp IV 1986) allows aggrieved parties to recover damages. See
infra note 66 and accompanying text.
45. 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
46. National Football League v. Alley, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 6, 9 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (citing
In the Matter of Regulation of Domestic Receive-Only Satellite Earth Stations, 74
F.C.C.2d 205, 216 (1979)).
47. Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 11, at 10-13. Plaintiffs anchor their claim of standing
to sue in § 605(e)(3)(A), which provides, "any person aggrieved by any violation of subsec-
tion (a) of this section . . . may bring a civil action." 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(A) (Supp. IV
1986). See also Alley, 624 F. Supp. at 9-10.
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not intended for the general public.4" The defendants disagree ve-
hemently, citing as evidence of the intent of a public transmission
the fact that if the plaintiffs intended for their transmissions to be
private, they would have encrypted them so that they could not be
received by the public.49 If the transmissions are found to be pub-
48. Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 11, at 8.
49. Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 23, at 5. Indeed, at first blush 47 U.S.C. §
605(b) seems to lend support to this contention because it specifically exempts from liability
under § 605(a) any individual who receives any satellite cable programming for private view-
ing if the program involved is not encrypted. However, broadcasters intending private com-
munications are under no statutory duty to encrypt their transmissions; rather, the statute
allows them to encrypt their transmissions for their own protection. See 47 U.S.C. §
605(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
Still, it is important to note that the defendants' fallback argument, in the event that
they cannot prove the transmissions were public communications, lies within § 605(b). Sec-
tion 605(b) is applicable only where the intercepted private transmission is not encrypted
and where there is no marketing system established under which the individual may obtain
authorization from the transmitter or its agent. Defendants may have an uphill battle to
prove that there is no licensing system available by which they can obtain a license to re-
ceive the NFL games. But see Letter to the Editor, Miami Herald, Oct. 30, 1989, at 14A, col.
3. Rebecca Gautier, General Manager of defendant Sports Page Lounge states that "the
NFL will not permit the bars and restaurants involved to negotiate fairly with it." Id. at col.
4. (This leaves aside any question of whether this license would allow the defendants to
display the games, which seems much more a matter of copyright law. See supra notes 11-
41 and accompanying text.)
If the defendants are successful in showing the § 605(b) exemption, they also will be
helped by the fact that some of the defendants did not intercept satellite cable transmis-
sions within the meaning of 605(b). Rather, the broadcasts were shown on stations that were
provided to defendants such as the Sports Page Lounge through the satellite subscription
service to which they subscribed. See infra text accompanying notes 61-65. This places de-
fendants squarely within the ambit of the policy goals of the Cable Communications Policy
Act (CCPA), Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (1984), the legislation that created § 605(b).
Section 605(b) functions as much to define ways in which the cable industry can protect
itself from piracy as it functions as a private use exception. Quincy Cablesystems, Inc. v.
Sully's Bar, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 1138, 1140-41 (D. Mass. 1988) (quoting Statement of Senator
Packwood, Chairman of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, on the
House Amendment to S. 66, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4742, 4745-
46). The Quincy court set forth a painstaking analysis of the legislative history of the
CCPA:
[W]hen Congress passed the ... Act, it was concerned about theft of cable ser-
vice .... The [Committee] report goes on to state that this loss [of revenues due
to theft] poses a major threat to the economic viability of cable operators and
programmers, and creates unfair burdens on cable subscribers who are forced to
subsidize those who are getting the service for free. In passing the CCPA, then,
Congress established the policy that only those who are authorized [should] re-
ceive cable service .... Moreover, the Committee Report also recognizes that
unauthorized interception of cable programming significantly injures the cable
programmers and operators, and the paying subscribers.
Quincy Cablesystems, 684 F. Supp. at 1143. Clearly, the intent of § 605(b) is to avoid a free
rider problem. If the court does not find that the transmissions were public, defendants such
as Sports Page Lounge have a ready argument that will help to justify their receipt of the
private signal under § 605(b): they have paid for their satellite service, so the policy of the
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lic, defendants would be able to rely on the public broadcast ex-
emption of section 605(a), which provides: "This section shall not
apply to the receiving... [of] the contents of any radio communi-
cation which is transmitted by any station for the use of the gen-
eral public ".... 50
The case law discussing section 605 in this context would seem
clearly to support the plaintiffs' contention that the transmissions
are private. In Quincy Cable Systems, Inc. v. Sully's Bar, Inc.,51
plaintiffs Quincy Cablesystems (QCS) and New England Sports
Network (NESN) won a summary judgment under section 60552
against three Quincy, Massachusetts bars that intercepted, by dish
antennae, signals sent by NESN to QCS for transmission to QCS's
cable subscribers.53 The court explained that the test under section
605 is appropriately "not whether the content of the program has
mass appeal or mass availability but rather, whether it was in-
tended for the use of the general public." '54 NESN intended its
transmission to be received only by QCS. 5
In a case in the Southern District of Florida, National Foot-
ball League v. Alley, Inc.,58 United States District Judge Kehoe
enjoined several Miami and Palm Beach County bars and restau-
rants from receiving and displaying Miami Dolphins' and other
NFL games.57 Judge Kehoe presumed the intent issue; he did not
specify precisely which transmissions the defendants had inter-
cepted, but it appears to have been either the televising networks'
transmission of the line feed from the stadium to its New York
studios (called the clean feed) or the feed from New York contain-
ing spliced-in commercials (called the dirty feed) to network affili-
statute has not been offended. However, the policy might be offended if the satellite sub-
scription service itself was not paying for what was a private transmission. Again, this begs
the question: was the subscription service receiving a signal which was intended for public
or private use?
50. 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
51. 684 F. Supp. 1138 (D. Mass. 1988).
52. Id. at 1141.
53. Id. at 1139.
54. Id. at 1140 (quoting Movie Systems, Inc. v. Heller, 710 F.2d 492, 494 (8th Cir.
1983)) (emphasis in original).
55. Id. Under § 605, the focus is upon the transmitter's intent for the actual transmis-
sion intercepted, not its ultimate destination (which normally would be the general public).
Even if the analysis focused on ultimate destination, the result in Quincy would have been
the same, for "[t]he plaintiffs [in Quincy] are in the business of providing programming to
paying customers, not to the general public." Id.
56. 624 F. Supp. 6 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
57. Id. at 11.
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ates. ss The court concluded, "Defendants' interception, divulgance
[sic] and use of private satellite communications for their own
benefit by public showings in their places of business violated
plaintiffs' rights under Section 605 .. .
Although the defendants in Beachland ° presently have not
asserted as much, it is clear that Quincy and Alley are distinguish-
able on their facts and Beachland, in fact, raises what appears to
be a novel question of law. At least one defendant here, the Sports
Page Lounge, did not intercept a network-to-affiliate or affiliate-to-
cable system transmission. Rather, the Sports Page Lounge re-
ceived the October 8, 1989, Miami Dolphins-Cleveland Browns
game from WXIA, an Atlanta-based television station, by way of
PRIMETIME 24, a satellite subscription service." This is signifi-
cant for the following reason: WXIA was broadcasting the game to
metro-Atlanta area residents by normal television means.2 The
public use exception of section 605(a) states that one is not liable
under this section when one receives "the contents of any radio
communication which is transmitted by any station for the use of
the general public. '63 WXIA was a station transmitting its signal 4
58. For an excellent discussion of the technology involved in broadcasting a live sports
competition, see National Football League v. McBee & Bruno's, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 880, 883-
84 (E.D. Mo. 1985), afl'd, 792 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986).
59. Alley, 624 F. Supp at 10-11 (emphasis added). The court made much of the fact
that the transmissions occurred over the C band frequency, 3700-4200 MHz, which cannot
be received without the use of a dish antenna. Id. at 9, 10. According to the court, the C
band is to be used only for point-to-point transmissions, not broadcasts. Id. at 10 (citing In
the Matter of Regulation of Domestic Receive-Only Satellite Earth Stations, 74 F.C.C.2d
205, 216 (1979)); 47 C.F.R. § 2.106 (1987)). The court apparently would find that any inter-
ception of a C-band transmission is per se a violation of § 605. Even so, Beachland presents
a wholly different situation, at least with respect to defendant Sports Page Lounge. The
telecast that Sports Page received was the public telecast of the game to metro-Atlanta area
residents by television station WXIA, so Sports Page did receive a broadcast. See infra
notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
60. National Football League v. Beachland Ventures, Inc., Civ. No. 89-2311 (S.D. Fla.
filed Oct. 17, 1989).
61. Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 23, at Appendix (affidavit of defendant
Frank Ambrose, owner of the Sports Page Lounge).
62. Telephone Interview with Jack Lease, employee of WXIA (October 30, 1989).
63. 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) (Supp. IV 1986) (emphasis added).
64. An issue likely to arise at trial is what properly is the focus of the court's broadcast
signal analysis in this context. One Eleventh Circuit case seems to hold clearly that the
question is not whether a station may originate the television signal of a blacked out game
within the blackout territory, but whether the station may send the signal of the game into
the blackout area when it has the right to show the game in the non-blackout territory.
WTWV, Inc. v. National Football League, 678 F.2d 142 (11th Cir. 1982). The WTWV court
also held that, in fact, the NFL can prevent a station from sending a signal into the black-
out territory. Id. at 146.
On the other hand, defendants in Beachland are likely to point to the Eighth Circuit's
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for the use of the general public. Further, the traditional intent
opinion in National Football League v. McBee & Bruno's, Inc., 792 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986),
which affirms the dismissal of the NFL's complaint against Sandrina's, a St. Louis area bar
that received blacked out St. Louis Cardinals games by regular television broadcast from a
station located outside the blackout territory. The McBee court held that the defendant bar
had not "done anything that even arguably violates the Communications Act .... Id. at
733. WTWV, then, certainly would support an action against PRIMETIME 24, for PRIME-
TIME 24 was the agent sending a signal into the blackout territory. But it is of questionable
application to Beachland, at least with respect to defendant Sports Page Lounge, for Sports
Page Lounge is much more like Sandrina's even though Sandrina's did not use a dish to
receive the game. See McBee, 792 F.2d at 728 n.3. In Beachland, the NFL seeks to enjoin
not the broadcast of its game but rather the receipt of its game by a bar owner receiving it
from an out-of-town television station (WXIA).
In working through these cases that seem to point it in different directions, the District
Court in Beachland may well be drawn to examine the underlying rationale for allowing the
NFL to black out its games; its origin lies in an exemption to the antitrust laws that the
Congress carved out specifically for telecasts of professional sporting events. See 15 U.S.C. §
1292 (1988). A thorough analysis of the subject could lead to startling conclusions, particu-
larly in light of the fact that Judge Hoeveler's temporary restraining order prohibits defend-
ants from receiving all games that are blacked out in the cities in which they are being
played, no matter how far away from defendants those cities may be, not simply Dolphins'
games blacked out at home. See Temporary Restraining Order, supra note 7.
The NFL draws its antitrust exemption from Title 15, United States Code sections 1291
and 1292. Careful examination of § 1292 reveals that it is poorly drafted and offers little
guidance in dealing with the admittedly complex question of whether a satellite dish user
can pull into the black out territory a broadcast from an area in which the game is not
blacked out without liability to its operator. This question differs from the typical questions
raised under section 1292 because, normally, under section 1292, the party looking to the
antitrust laws for remedy is a broadcaster challenging the NFL's right to refuse to allow the
broadcaster to carry the blacked out game. Section 1292 insulates the NFL from this type of
claim, but seems to have no ready answer as to suits in contexts other than this narrow one,
specifically suits involving persons receiving the blacked out telecasts. The exemption was
designed to encourage gate attendance at professional sporting events, in recognition that
this would benefit the sports leagues, and therefore the public. The black out rule provides
that a given game may be blacked out in the area consisting of a seventy-five mile radius
from the event site if the game tickets have not been sold out seventy-two hours before
kickoff. The defendants are likely to muster a strong challenge to the validity of this pre-
mise at trial. Assuming arguendo that this actually does have an effect on the gate receipts,
there is no logical reason for section 1292 to prevent the viewing in Miami of a game that,
for example, arises in Seattle and is blacked out in Seattle in an attempt to draw Seattle-
area fans. Yet, Judge Hoeveler's decision enjoins the defendants' reception of all NFL
games, regardless of city of origin. Cf. National Football League v. McBee & Bruno's, Inc.,
621 F. Supp. 880, 891-92 (E.D. Mo. 1985), aff'd, 792 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986); National
Football League v. Alley, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 6, 10-11 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (district courts' orders
enjoin the defendant bar owners from receiving all NFL games via satellite dish although
the bodies of the opinions discuss only the receipt of locally blacked out games); Letter to
the Editor, supra note 49, at col. 3 ("What harm [can] possibly come to the NFL if local bar
owners decide to show another game than the games on our local TV sets?"). In essence, the
statute's utter lack of limits to define the appropriate scope of the exemption has caused the
courts to allow plaintiffs to use as a sword that which was intended as a shield.
As a final comment on the subject, it is worthy of note that an order so broad can lead
to other absurd results. By its terms, the order prevents defendants from receiving by satel-
lite from another city any game which is blacked out in the defendant's home city. This
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test of section 605 has been satisfied because WXIA did intend the
general public to receive its transmission. Its broadcast of the Dol-
phins-Browns game should be considered not a private transmis-
sion but rather a public use exception transmission. Therefore, de-
fendant Sports Page Lounge's receptio.. of the game was not
violative of section 605.65
This factual distinction also will be relevant to defendants' ar-
guments to avoid liability for damages under section 605"6 by
showing that plaintiffs suffer no actual harm from defendants' in-
terception of the broadcast signal: if the broadcast already was
public, no damage resulted.
CONCLUSION
National Football League v. Beachland Ventures, Inc. has the po-
tential to be one of the most important decisions to date involving
the NFL's black out rule. The defendants, seizing on language in
the Eighth Circuit's opinion in National Football League v. McBee
& Bruno's, Inc., argue that satellite dishes have become receiving
apparatuses of a kind commonly found in the home, and that, as
such, their reception and display of the blacked out games does not
infringe the plaintiffs' copyright. In essence, the defendants argue
that the receipt by satellite dish puts the use within the "common
use" exception embodied in section 110(5) of the Copyright Act of
1976. The plaintiffs argue that, as the circumstances have not
changed substantially since McBee, satellite dishes are still not
sufficiently common-place to meet section 110(5)'s exception. The
resolution of this issue cannot be predicted but it appears that the
leads to a logical result and faithfully executes the intent of § 1292 when the recipient him-
self is located within the blackout territory. But what of the circumstance where the recipi-
ent is located thousands of miles away from the blackout territory and a local television
station in his area is carrying the game. The broad brush of the order would force a defend-
ant who wishes to see the game to watch it on his local station or not at all-even if for
some reason he prefers to watch it on a non-local station (for example, he wishes to hear the
station's news briefs in another city). It will be up to the court to decide whether such a
result is tolerable.
65. This does not, however, answer whether it was violative of plaintiffs' copyrights.
See supra notes 11-41 and accompanying text.
66. Section 605(e) sets forth the relief that the court may grant, which includes: in-
junctions [(e)(3)(B)(i)], costs and attorneys' fees [(e)(3)(B)(iii)], and damages [(e)(3)(B)(ii)].
Damages are determined under § 605 (e)(3)(C) and may involve the aggrieved party's actual
damages f(e)(3)(C)(i)(I)), or a statutory damage remedy between $1000 and $10,000, with
the actual amount awarded at the judge's discretion [(e)(3)(C)(i)(II)]. In addition, if the
violation was willful and committed for the purpose of direct or indirect commercial advan-
tage, the court may add to the damages an award not to exceed $100,000 per infringement.
47 U.S.C. § 605 (e)(3)(C)(ii) (Supp. IV 1986).
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plaintiffs may have the upper hand in this argument.
Should they decide to argue it, the defendants might raise a
novel question of law with respect to the plaintiffs' claim under
section 605 of the Federal Communications Act. Defendant Sports
Page Lounge arguably received a blacked out game when the game
already was a public transmission. For this reason, Beachland, at
least with respect to Sports Page Lounge, is distinguishable from
the cases which preceded it, for in all other cases, the defendants
clearly intercepted a private transmission. As a result of this fac-
tual distinction, the court may have to premise any finding of lia-
bility in Beachland on copyright grounds alone.
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